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Introduction
For ten-year-old Rajinder Cheema, an innocent game of basket-
ball sparked a daunting chain of events far beyond the scope of a typi-
cal child's day. One January afternoon, while he was playing
basketball with his classmates, one of them noticed that he was wear-
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on this Note; to Paulina do Amaral for her editorial assistance; and to my mother, who has
taught me to shoot for my dreams. I must give special thanks to my brother, whose con-
stant support is a daily reminder of his boundless faith in my abilities. Finally, this Note is
dedicated to my father, without whom nothing would be possible.
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ing something underneath his clothes.1 The "something" was in fact a
kirpan-a small, ceremonial knife2 worn by practicing Sikhs3 around
the world. When school officials discovered this fact, they suspended
Rajinder from school, which in turn triggered several trips to federal
court and substantial media attention. Now, Rajinder must look to a
most unexpected place to solve his playground problems-he must re-
fer to the United States Constitution.
When the Framers first conceived the language of the Free Exer-
cise Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution, they could
not have had in mind the Cheema family in the not-yet established
state of California. Indeed, it is doubtful that they had any familiarity
with the Cheemas' faith-Sikhism, an ancient religion founded in the
northern part of India. Yet the Framers' constitutional legacy of reli-
gious freedom not only touches on the Cheemas, but may actually be
very important to them, permitting them to continue practicing a fun-
damental tenet of their religion.
What are the words that the Framers wrote and ratified, and
more importantly, what do they mean? The actual language of the
religion clauses of the First Amendment is rather simple. It mandates
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."4 But as with most
other clauses in the Constitution, the meaning of these words is quite
another story. These two clauses, referred to as the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, have since their origin been the
regular subject of judicial and academic attention. Attempts to clarify
the meaning of the clauses through this jurisprudence have been only
partially successful. Complicating matters further, Congress has sup-
plemented the protections in the Constitution with statutory safe-
gaurds for religious activity. Today, the federal courts will again be
forced to ponder the scope of free exercise protection in Cheema v.
Thompson, a case pending before the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of California.'
Known colloquially as the "knives in school" case, Cheema will
likely have far greater legal significance than this catchy sound-bite
1. Brief for Appellant at 7, Cheema v. Thompson, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24160 (9th
Cir. Sept. 2, 1994) (No. 94-16097). This brief was prepared by counsel for the Cheema
family in support of its appeal of the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction.
2. Whether kirpans should be considered knives or merely symbolic and ceremonial
objects is at issue in this case. This issue will be addressed infra note 217.
3. The tenets of Sikhism are discussed infra notes 22-38 and accompanying text.
4. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. The Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause and
the Establishment Clause apply to the states in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940), and Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), respectively.
5. This case is currently awaiting trial on the merits. For the procedural history of
this case, see infra notes 59-82 and accompanying text.
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might suggest. Not only does the case involve the Free Exercise
Clause, but it also implicates important social issues such as local con-
trol over public schools and the growing problem of crime within the
American education system.
The facts of the case are considerably simpler than the legal issues
it presents. Rajinder, Sukhjinder and Jaspreet Cheema are students in
the Livingston Union School District.6 Following a central tenet of
their religion, these baptized Khalsa Sikhs7 wore ceremonial knives
known as "kirpans" to school.8 When the Livingston Union School
District asked the students to remove the kirpans while on school
property, the students refused, citing religious freedom as their
grounds. 9 The school district promptly suspended them pursuant to a
district policy prohibiting weapons on school property. 1°
On April 15, 1994, the Cheemas filed an action in federal court,"
claiming that the school district's actions violated the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).'2 Initially, the Cheemas
moved for a preliminary injunction that would have required the
school district to allow the Cheema children to attend school wearing
kirpans until the resolution of the underlying litigation.'3 After the
case bounced back and forth between trial and appellate courts a few
times, a preliminary injunction was finally entered and maintained.' 4
The preliminary injunction now in effect attempts to accomodate both
the students' desire to carry the kirpans and the school district's need
to assure a safe environment.' 5 Although the preliminary injunction
will obviously not be binding on the district court when it resolves the
merits of the case, the opinions generated during the preliminary in-
junction battle do provide a glimpse as to the case's possible outcome.
At the very least, the opinions are helpful in framing the issues
involved.
The law under which plaintiffs brought suit, RFRA, was enacted
by Congress in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Employ-
ment Division v. Smith.'6 In Smith, the Court reinterpreted and ar-
guably rewrote the constitutional law applicable to government
6. Brief for Appellant at 6, Cheema (No. 94-16097).
7. IdL at 2.
8. Id. at 7.
9. Id.
10. The Livingston Union School District "no weapons" policy is in accord with Cali-
fornia laws prohibiting weapons on school grounds. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.10(a)
(West 1995) and CAL. EDuc. CODE § 48915(a) (West 1995).
11. Brief for Appellant at 9, Cheema (No. 94-16097).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1995).
13. Cheema v. Thompson, No. F-94-5360, slip. op. (E.D. Cal. May 27, 1994).
14. See discussion infra notes 59-82 and accompanying text.
15. Cheema v. Thompson, No. F-94-5360, slip. op. at 12-13 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 1994).
16. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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regulations that infringe on the free exercise of religion. 17 The Smith
Court decided laws that are facially neutral and generally applicable
are not subject to the strict scrutiny standard of review."8 Because the
Oregon statute at issue in Smith, which "prohibit[ed] the knowing or
intentional possession of a 'controlled substance' unless the substance
has been prescribed by a medical practitioner," did not target any spe-
cific religion or even religion generally, the Court upheld it under the
new more relaxed test." In passing RFRA, Congress specifically re-
stored the standard of scrutiny used in reviewing Free Exercise Clause
claims prior to Smith.20 As the Ninth Circuit put it, the "[Congress']
intent to overrule Smith and reinstate prior federal case law is evident
in its finding that 'the compelling interest test as set forth in prior
federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances
between religious liberty and competing prior governmental
interests."
'' 21
Cheema v. Thompson raises several vexing questions involving
the Free Exercise Clause, RFRA, and general policy concerns sur-
rounding safety in public schools. This Note will examine Cheema us-
ing both the Smith analysis and the strict scrutiny standard required by
RFRA. Part I provides a background of Sikhism, the vital role the
kirpan plays in this religion, as well as the procedural history of the
case. Part II explores the various standards of scrutiny applied to free
exercise cases and reviews both the district and circuit courts' applica-
tions of these standards. Part III then analyzes in more detail one
aspect of the standard of scrutiny-the school district's interest in en-
suring a safe environment for its students. Part III also questions
whether the school district's current policy is the least restrictive way
of promoting that interest. Part IV considers the legal and social im-
plications of Cheema on future cases involving the free exercise of
religion. Part V then concludes that RFRA as currently drafted is not
sufficient to protect the interests of parties pursuing free exercise
claims and should be amended. Specifically, this part proposes
amendments that afford meaningful protection to free exercise values,
while addressing public fears that arise when too many religious
groups seek to exempt themselves from otherwise important and gen-
erally applicable legal norms and standards. Finally, Part V tests the
workability of the proposed amendments by applying them to two re-
cent cases also brought under RFRA.
17. Id at 882.
18. Id at 879-81.
19. Id at 874 (citing OR. REv. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1987)).
20. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4. See also infra notes 153-160.
21. Cheema v. Thompson, No. 94-16097, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24160, at *7 (9th Cir.
Sept. 2, 1994) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(a)(5)).
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L Background
A. Sikhism and the Role of the Irpan
The Sikh religion was founded over 500 years ago by the prophet
Guru Naanak Dev.2 The central tenets of the religion have devel-
oped over a span of 240 years, fueled by the contribution of ten Mas-
ters.23 There are currently over 18 million Sikhs worldwide, a
minority of whom commit "to make the obligations of their faith cen-
tral to their lives by becoming baptized, or Khalsa Sikhs."'24
The word "Sikh" is derived from a Sanskrit word meaning "A
pupil; disciple; scholar."25 The last of the ten Sikh Gurus, Gobind
Singh, established certain requirements to be followed by devout
Sikhs. Both the baptism and the requirements are designed to pro-
mote group consciousness, to distinguish the Silkhs from Hindus and
Muslims, and finally, to serve as a constant reminder of the religion's
tenets.26 The requirements include a vow taken by a Khalsa Sikh that
he will never trim or shave his hair, or remove it by any other means
from any part of his body, that he will never consume intoxicants or
artificial stimulants, that he will never eat meat or eggs, or indulge in
lustful activities outside of marriage.27 Khalsa Sikhs are also required
by their faith to wear five sacred symbols, or articles of faith and iden-
tity, at all times.28 These are known as the "five K's" (panj kakaars),
and include the kes (long hair), the kanghaa (comb), the karaa (a steel
or iron bracelet), the kachhairaa (specially designed and stitched un-
derwear), and the kirpan (a small sword, worn with a strap of cloth).29
One Sikh scholar has observed that "[it is very important that Sikhs
should always wear these five essential articles of faith and uniform on
their person, without which they cannot be identified as Sikhs.
3 0
Sikhs wear these articles whether they are at work or at school. The
articles are worn even during bathing or sleeping. The kirpan-the
item at issue in Cheema-generally goes unnoticed because it is worn
underneath the clothing and is not removed from its sheath except
during certain ceremonial events in the Sikh temple.
22. CLINTON H. LOEHLN, THE GRANTH OF GURU GOBIND SINGH 1 (1971).
23. SURINDER SINGH KOHLI, R=AL SIKmSM 5 (1994). The importance of its first
prophet, however, is not to be understated. Guru Naanak Dev's teachings came to be
known as Sikhism in due course of time. SANTOKH SINGH, FUNDAMENTALS OF SuKHISM 21
(1991).
24. Brief for Appellant at 1, Cheema v. Thompson, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24160 (9th
Cir. Sept. 2, 1994) (No. 94-16097).
25. KoHLI, supra note 23, at 15.
26. Id.
27. SINGH, supra note 23, at 67.
28. Id. at 91.
29. Id. at 91-97.
30. Id. at 97.
882 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23:877
A great deal of Sikh literature is devoted to the meaning and im-
portance of the five symbols. The kes, or long hair, is "among the
most cherished and distinctive signs of an individual's membership of
the Sikh Panth. 31 It is also a tangible link to the original Gurus who
wore their hair in that fashion32 and a sign of respect to God who
inexplicably gave the human being the gift of hair.33 The kangha, or
comb, symbolizes order and discipline. 4 The karaa or steel band, rep-
resents the unbreakable bond between the Sikh and his or her faith.35
The kachhairaa, or special undergarments, prevents the arousal of
lustful thoughts.36 Finally, the kirpan is a symbol of self-respect, free-
dom from oppression and the triumph of spiritual knowledge.37 At
least one Sikh historian has noted that "the sword reminds us of our
being sovereign, just, and God's soldier; to stand against oppression
and to protect the weak and oppressed. '38 Abandoning the kirpan
would thus have great religious significance, which is why the
Cheemas refused to remove it from their persons, even while on
school property.
B. The History of Cheema v. Thompson
The Cheema family is one of many Sikh families residing in Liv-
ingston, California.39 The Livingston Union School District adminis-
ters the local schools, including the one that the Cheema children
attend. 0 In December 1993, Rajinder, Sukhjinder and Jaspreet
Cheema were baptized as Khalsa Sikhs.4 In preparation for their
baptism, the Cheemas participated in an intensive training course to
become familiar with the obligations of Khalsa.42 In particular, they
were admonished not to use the kirpan as a toy or weapon and were
advised that it is to be worn in its sheath and removed only for certain
religious ceremonies.4 3 Generally, a kirpan worn by a child has a
blade approximately three to four inches long.44 Often, the handle is
stitched to the cloth strap (or gatra) in which it is carried to ensure
31. J.P. Singh Uberoi, The Five Symbols of Sikhism, in SUCHism 123 (1969).
32. SURINDER SINGH JOHAR, HANDBOOK ON SIKHisM ch. 5 (1977).
33. SINGH, supra note 23, at 69-70.
34. JOHAR, supra note 32, at 94.
35. Id. at 95.
36. SINGH, supra note 23, at 96-97.
37. JOHAR, supra note 32, at 95-96.
38. SINGH, supra note 23, at 97.
39. Brief for Appellant at 2, Cheema v. Thompson, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24160 (9th
Cir. Sept. 2, 1994) (No. 94-16097).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 6 (citing R. at 118, 3).
42. Id.
43. Id- at 7 (citing R. at 238-39, 11-13).
44. Id at 7 n.3.
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that the kirpan will not fall out or be removed casually4 5
In January of 1994, the Cheema children returned to school wear-
ing their new kirpans. Soon thereafter, one of Rajinder's classmates
noticed Rajinder's kirpan,4 and brought it to the attention of a
teacher who then questioned Rajinder about it.47 Rajinder explained
to the teacher that he wore the kirpan for religious purposes.48 When
his siblings were questioned a short while later, they responded
similarly.
49
Apparently unsatisfied with this response, the school district sus-
pended the Cheema children for violating the California Penal and
Education Codes as well as district regulations.50 The school district
contended that the kirpans were weapons within the meaning of these
codes and could not be allowed onto school grounds.51 Despite the
Cheemas' efforts to explain the religious significance of the kirpan,
the school district refused to allow the students on campus as long as
they were wearing kirpans.52
On March 8, 1994, the district's Board of Trustees considered the
issue at a formal meeting,53 and voted to refuse accommodation of the
Cheemas.54 Allowing kirpans to be worn, the Board stated, would
compromise school safety.55 On March 22, counsel for the Cheemas
made a direct request to the school district, asking it to revoke its
policy and allow the Cheema children to return to school.56 The
Cheemas also requested that, at the very least, the children be allowed
to return to school with the kirpans while litigation was pending.57
45. IM (citing R. at 123, 22; R. at 239, 1 14). Although some Sikhs find such stitching
is religiously offensive, the Cheemas have agreed that such stitching is acceptable. Id. at 7
n.3. Thus, the court in Cheema need not entertain the issue of whether kirpans would be
allowed on school property absent the stitching.
46. Id at 7 (citing R. at 132, 1 4).
47. IM (citing R. at 132, [ 5-6).
48. Id.
49. Id
50. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.10(a) (West 1995) ("Any person .... [with certain
exceptions], who brings or possesses any dirk, dagger, ice pick, knife having a blade longer
than 2 1/2 inches... upon the grounds of, or within any public or private school providing
instruction in kindergarten or any of grades 1 to 12, inclusive, is guilty of a public offense,
punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by imprisonment in
the state prison."); see also CAL. EDuc. CODE § 48915(a)(2) (West 1995) (providing the
grounds for expulsion: "Possession of any knife, explosive, or other dangerous object of no
reasonable use to the pupil at school or at a school activity off school grounds").
51. Brief for Appellant at 7, Cheema v. Thompson, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24160 (9th
Cir. Sept. 2, 1994) (No. 94-16097).
52. Id. at 7 (citing R. at 132-33, 1 5-9; R. at 119-20, 1 9, 11-13; R. at 137-38, 1 8-9).
53. Id. at 7 (citing R. at 138, [ 10).
54. Id at 8 (citing R. at 138-39).
55. Id (citing R. at 181-82).
56. Id (citing R. at 190-92).
57. Id (citing R. at 191).
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The school district denied both requests and instead left the Cheemas




The Cheemas ffied suit on April 15, 1994.59 They sought a tempo-
rary restraining order (TRO) as well as preliminary and permanent
injunctions.60 In ruling on the motions for preliminary relief, the dis-
trict court made some important observations. The court acknowl-
edged the sincerity of the plaintiffs' religious belief, and the obligation
of the baptized or initiated Khalsa Sikhs to wear the kirpans on their
persons.61 The court also recognized the substantial burden imposed
on the Cheemas by the school district's policy.62 The district court
also found that the Cheema children "[had been] advised that the
kirpan is not to be considered a toy or used as a weapon short of a life
or death situation."'63 But after examining the kirpans, Judge Burrell
determined that, notwithstanding the religious significance of the
kirpan, its secular character, purpose, and function as a knife could
not be ignored.64 He concluded that "a knife is a knife, '65 going on to
note:
In addition to the danger presented by the weapon-like charac-
ter of the kirpan, the presence of kirpans would disrupt the
school environment since the kirpans would mostly be perceived
as knives by others in school. Moreover, the district was con-
cerned that the kirpans would have a detrimental impact on
many children and staff, particularly if they felt their sense of
58. Id; see R. at 194-95; R. at 204; R. at 311.
59. Id at 9.
60. The action was filed not only on behalf of the three Cheema children who were
suspended from school but also on behalf of several adults who were threatened with
arrest for wearing their kirpans on school grounds while attending the Board of Trustees
meeting on March 8, 1994. Id. at 9 n.5. The plaintiffs' motions for a TRO and preliminary
injunction, however, were brought only on behalf of the Cheema children since the pres-
sing concern was that of the children who have been deprived of their opportunity to ob-
tain public education. Id. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the TRO
and preliminary injunction. Cheema v. Thompson, No. 94-16097, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS
24160 (9th Cir. Sept. 2, 1994). The underlying action, however, continues on behalf of both
the children and the adults.
61. Cheema v. Thompson, No. F-94-5360, slip. op. at 2-3, 12-13 (E.D. Cal. May 27,
1994).
62. Id at 12-13.
63. Id at 3.
64. Id at 20.
65. Id.
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security was undermined.66
Finding the school district's policy in accord with the California
Constitution, Article 1, Section 28(c), the California Penal Code Sec-
tion 626.10(a), and the California Education Code Section 48915(a),
the district court went on to rule that "a home study program would
satisfy the California compulsory education requirements for chil-
dren."67 The relevance of this finding, however, is far from clear, inas-
much as there has never been any suggestion that the Cheemas intend
to participate in a home study program.68 Based on these findings and
rulings, the district court denied plaintiffs' preliminary injunctive
relief.
69
After accepting the district court's factual findings, the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed,70 holding that the district court abused its discretion by
incorrectly analyzing the underlying issues of the case.7 1 But the ap-
pellate court stressed that its ruling did "not reach the merits of this
case and that the disposition of this appeal... [would] affect the rights
of the parties only until the district court render[ed] judgment on the
merits."72 In ruling on the appeal from the denial of plaintiffs' prelim-
inary injunction, the circuit court observed that the correct standard
requires that the court take into account the likelihood of harm to the
children as well as each side's likelihood of success on its merits.73
Applying the first part of this test, the court found that the Cheema
children would suffer irreparable injury if they were prohibited from
attending school, and that home schooling would hardly be a substi-
tute for in-class education.74 In this connection, the court recognized
that in-class education is particularly crucial for children such as the
Cheemas, whose contact with other children is necessary to the devel-
opment of their English skills.'
In assessing the likelihood of success on the merits, the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that the district court had improperly applied the legal
standards provided in RFRA.76 RFRA places the burden on the state
to show that its action restraining the free exercise of religious prac-
66. Brief of Respondent at 15, Cheema v. Thompson, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24160
(9th Cir. Sept. 2, 1994) (No. 94-16097). This brief was written in opposition of the
Cheemas' appeal of the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction.
67. Cheema v. Thompson, No. F-94-5360, slip. op. at 7 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 1994).
68. See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
69. Cheema v. Thompson, No. F-94-5360, slip. op. (E. D. Cal. May 27, 1994).
70. Cheema v. Thompson, No. 94-16097, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24160 (9th Cir. Sept.
2, 1994).
71. Id at *3.
72. Id.
73. Id. at *4 (citing Gilder v. PGA Tour Inc., 936 F.2d 417, 422 (9th Cir. 1991)).
74. Id
75. Id
76. Id at *3.
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tices is "the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling gov-
ernmental interest."' 7 The district court ignored this requirement,
and the record is devoid of any evidence that the school district's pol-
icy is the least restrictive means possible.78 In fact, the Cheemas
themselves have offered a less restrictive means: they have agreed to
provide their children with shorter kirpans that are sewn into their
sheaths.79 Because the irreparable harm and likelihood of success
analyses cut in plaintiffs' favor, the court of appeals reversed and re-
manded to the district court.
8 0
Guided by the Ninth Circuit's decision, the district court formu-
lated the terms of the preliminary injunction governing the conditions
under which the students could return to school.8' Pursuant to this
district court order, the Cheemas returned to school and are anxiously
awaiting a decision on the merits of the case. Meanwhile, the school
district's attempt to appeal the specific provisions of this order was
summarily rejected by the Ninth Circuit.°
H. The Progression of Free Exercise Jurisprudence
In ruling twice on the preliminary injunction sought by the
Cheemas, the Ninth Circuit declined-quite properly given the case's
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b)(2) (1995).
78. Cheema v. Thompson, No. 94-16097, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24160, at *5 (9th Cir.
Sept. 2, 1994).
79. Id
.80. 1& at *3. The Ninth Circuit specifically noted that the record reflected no evi-
dence of any accommodation, even temporary accommodation, that the district was willing
to provide the students until the case could be decided. I& at *10-*11. However, from the
court's analysis it is doubtful that the school district's policy could withstand judicial scru-
tiny with only temporary accommodation. It seems clear from the court's opinion that an
absolute prohibition of kirpans on school property is not the least restrictive means for the
state to further its interest. Thus, the mention of temporary accommodation by the court
seems unnecessary.
81. Cheema v. Thompson, No. F-94-5360, slip. op (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 1994). The order
required that:
(1) the kirpan will be of the type demonstrated to the Board and to the District
Court, that is: a dull blade, approximately 3 - 3 1/2 inches in length with a total
length of approximately 6 1/2 -7 inches including its sheath; (2) the kirpan will be
sewn tightly to its sheath; (3) the kirpan will be worn on a cloth strap under the
children's clothing so that it is not readily visible; (4) a designated official of the
District may make reasonable inspections to confirm that the conditions specified
about are being adhered to; (5) if any of the conditions specified above are vio-
lated, the student's privilege of wearing his or her kirpan may be suspended; and
(6) the District will take all reasonable steps to prevent any harassment, intimida-
tion or provocation of the Cheema children by any employee or student in the
District and will take appropriate disciplinary action to prevent and redress such
action, should it occur.
I& at 12-13.
82. Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995).
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procedural posture-to decide the merits. Instead, it has left this task
to the trial court. To assess how the district court should resolve this
case on the merits, it is necessary to review the development of the
legal standards applied by the United States Supreme Court in Free
Exercise Clause cases.
Although Supreme Court decisions surrounding the Free Exer-
cise Clause are relatively scant, basic principles have developed over
time. Constitutional scholars have observed that:
[T]he Court has consistently held that the government may not
punish religious beliefs. The government may not impose bur-
dens on, or give benefits to, people solely because of their reli-
gious beliefs. Because federal, state and local governmental
entities have not engaged in many activities that could be de-
scribed as the punishment of religious beliefs, there are very few
Supreme Court decisions explaining the meaning of that consti-
tutional restriction .
3
Judicial interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause began with the
landmark case of Reynolds v. United States.84 The petitioners in Reyn-
olds challenged the validity of a state statute outlawing polygamy.
5
In upholding the statute, the Court reasoned that while the First
Amendment's protection seems absolute, it is not.8 6 In fact, religious
activity must conform to neutral legislative policies that regulate con-
duct.87 Holding that free exercise extends only to religious beliefs, the
Court blithely deferred to the State and justified its deference by stat-
ing that an exemption for the Mormon plaintiffs would render Gov-
ernment futile, and permit "every citizen to become a law unto
himself.' 88
The Reynolds Court's restrictive understanding of the Free Exer-
cise Clause did not last forever. The Court has since realized that the
Free Exercise Clause cannot be reconciled with unfettered deference
to governmental acts.89 Moreover, the Court recognized that the First
Amendment's protection is not limited only to religious beliefs-reli-
gious practices are equally important.90
The origins of this change in judicial philosophy can be found in
Braunfeld v. Brown,91 where Orthodox Jews challenged a state crimi-
83. JoHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1206 (4th ed.,
West 1991) (1978).
84. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
85. Id. at 161.
86. Id. at 166.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 167.
89. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,304 (1940); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 402-03 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219-20 (1972).
90. See generally Cantwell, 310 U.S. 296; Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398; Yoder, 406 U.S. 205.
91. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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nal statute marking Sunday the official Sabbath Day and requiring
that businesses be closed that day.92 The challengers were store own-
ers who argued that their religion required Saturday to be Sabbath,
and that they were financially disadvantaged if they were unable to
operate their stores for both days.93 Despite the Court's sympathy for
the challengers' plight, the Court refused to grant them an exemption
from the statute.94 Instead, the Court opined that, because the eco-
nomic burdens were incidental, they should not override otherwise
valid legislation.95
The importance of the Braunfeld decision is not in its holding, but
in its reasoning. Although the claimants lost, this case represents the
first time the Court entertained the notion that facially neutral laws
could have disparate effects on religious minorities. The Court specif-
ically recognized that a general law may be invalidated if the state can
accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose a burden on
religious groups.96 The decision in Braunfeld articulated the anteced-
ents of the compelling interest test formally developed in cases follow-
ing it.9
7
Guided by the Braunfeld reasoning, the Court in Sherbert v. Ver-
ner98 "effectively expanded the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom well beyond Reynolds by assigning a presumption of validity
to all religious conduct."9 9 The Sherbert Court struck down a South
Carolina statute under which a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist
Church had been denied unemployment benefits"'0 because she re-
fused to work on Saturday, the Sabbath day of her faith.' 0' After be-
ing fired for failing to show up to work on a Saturday, Ms. Sherbert
filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits under the
South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act. 02 The agency de-
nied her application relying on a provision of the Act that made a
claimant ineligible if he or she had failed, without good cause, to ac-
cept suitable work when offered.'0 3 The United States Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court, which
92. Id. at 600.
93. Id at 601.
94. Id. at 609.
95. Id at 606-07.
96. IL at 607.
97. Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of
Religion, 102 HARv. L. REv. 933, 940 (1989).
98. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
99. Tania Saison, Restoring Obscurity: The Shortcomings of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 28 COLUM J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 653, 666 (1995).
100. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 400-02.
101. Id. at 399.
102. S.C. Code, it. 68, §§ 68-1 to 68-404, cited in Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402 n.3.
103. Id.
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had sustained the state's statute as applied to Sherbert's case.1' 4 First,
the Court required the religious claimant to show that the state's regu-
lation imposed a substantial burden on the free exercise of her reli-
gion.'0 s If the claimant made such a showing, the Court applied the
strictest level of scrutiny:
If, therefore, the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court
is to withstand appellant's constitutional challenge, it must be
either because her disqualification as a beneficiary represents no
infringement by the State of her constitutional rights of free ex-
ercise, or because any incidental burden on the free exercise of
appellant's religion may be justified by a "compelling state inter-
est in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional
power to regulate.'
0 6
The Court further explained that "no showing merely of a ra-
tional relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in
this highly sensitive constitutional area, '[o]nly the gravest abuses, en-
dangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limita-
tion. ' "10 7 In looking to whether South Carolina's scheme was the least
restrictive, the Court distinguished Braunfield.10 8 It held that unlike
Braunfield, there was no reason that the State could not grant an ex-
emption from its policy to the claimant-in essence, granting this ex-
emption would not nullify the law as it would have in Braunfield.10 9
Applying this strict scrutiny test, the Sherbert Court struck down the
South Carolina scheme. 1 0
The Court had yet another opportunity to extend the rights pro-
tected by the Free Exercise Clause in Wisconsin v. Yoder."' At issue
in Yoder was a Wisconsin law that required a child's continued attend-
ance in public or private school until the age of sixteen. 112 The Court
rejected the State's compulsory school attendance law as it applied to
members of the Amish religion, whose children stopped going to
school after the eighth grade. 13 The Court held that Wisconsin's in-
terest in universal education must be balanced against individual
104. Id at 402.
105. Id. at 403. The requirement that the state's regulation impose a substantial burden
has remained constant throughout free exercise jurisprudence. See, e.g., Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,210-12 (1972); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707,717-18 (1978). It
is also specifically articulated in RFRA. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1995). In Sherbert, as with
the cases discussed infra, notes 111-147 and accompanying text, this was not a point of
contention.
106. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
107. Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
108. Id at 408-09.
109. Id
110. Id. at 410.
111. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
112. Id at 207.
113. Id.
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rights such as the free exercise of religion.11 4 Although the Court did
not specifically analyze the case according to the two-part test tradi-
tionally associated with strict scrutiny, it did consider the weightiness
of the State's interests and the means used to accomplish these
goals." 5 The balancing test employed in Yoder has been described by
some scholars as one that is more "open" than the traditional compel-
ling interest test."6 Notably, the Yoder Court did not incorporate the
word "compelling" in the test by which it determined the validity of
the law." 7 Furthermore, the Court never specifically required the
State to demonstrate that its policies were the least restrictive means
to accomplish the stated end."' Instead, the Court simply balanced
the State's interests with those of the challengers." 9 Nevertheless, the
Court's informal approach produced the same results as if strict scru-
tiny had been applied. The Yoder Court recognized that:
Insofar as the State's claim rests on the view that a brief addi-
tional period of formal education is imperative to enable the
Amish to participate effectively and intelligently in our demo-
cratic process, it must fall. The Amish alternative to formal sec-
ondary school education has enabled them to function
effectively in their day-to-day life under self-imposed limitations
on relations with the world, and to survive and prosper in con-
temporary society as a separate, sharply identifiable and highly
self-sufficient community for more than 200 years in this
country.
120
Regardless of the specific terminology used to describe this bal-
ancing test, the Court clearly required the State to articulate more
than a rational basis for its regulation. 12  In applying its flexible test
to the facts of Yoder, the Court found that the State did have a strong
interest in the education of minors. 22 The Court stated:
We turn, then, to the State's broader contention that its interest
in its system of compulsory education is so compelling that even
the established religious practices of the Amish must give way.
Where fundamental claims of religious freedom are at stake,
however, we cannot accept such a sweeping claim; despite its
admitted validity in the generality of cases, we must searchingly
examine the interests that the State seeks to promote ... and
114. Id. at 214.
115. Id. at 213-36.
116. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 83, at 1225.
117. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 224-29; NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 83 at 1225.
118. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 227.
119. Id. at 224-27.
120. Id. at 225.
121. Id- at 227 (requiring a "more particularized showing from the State ... to justify
the severe interference with religious freedom such additional compulsory attendance
would entail").
122. Id. at 213, 221, 238.
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the impediment to those objectives that would flow from recog-
nizing the claimed Amish exemption."z
In addition, as in Sherbert, the Court required a showing that the
religious beliefs in question were sincere or legitimate. 2 4
Some of the Court's opinions since Yoder reflect the Court's fo-
cus not on the legitimacy of the State's interests, but whether those
interests are flatly inconsistent with the recognition of exemptions for
religious groups. For example, in Thomas v. Review Board,'2 Mr.
Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness, left his job with an employer who was
involved directly in producing weapons because such work violated
his religious beliefs. 26 Thomas was subsequently denied unemploy-
ment insurance because his voluntary termination was not based upon
"[g]ood cause [which was] job-related and objective in character."' 27
In reviewing Thomas' free exercise claim, the Court acknowledged
that the state had an important interest in "avoid[ing] ... widespread
unemployment."' 28 However, the Court's inquiry focused on identify-
ing an interest that was much narrower than simply avoiding unem-
ployment. Specifically, the Court noted that recognizing the
exemption sought by the Jehovah's Witnesses was not likely to create
the actual harm of "widespread unemployment." 2 9 Since there was
no evidence in the record to indicate that this policy was the least
restrictive means to prevent widespread employment, the Court up-
held the free exercise claim and required an exemption from the state
regulation.1
30
The reasoning in Yoder and Thomas, however, did not carry the
day in subsequent cases.' 3' Until 1990, at least theoretically, all laws
that burdened the free exercise of religion were subject to the highest
123. Id. at 221.
124. Id. at 214-17. The "sincerity of beliefs" requirement will be discussed infra notes
269-281 and accompanying text.
125. 450 U.S. 707 (1978).
126. Id. at 709.
127. 1 at 712-13.
128. Id. at 718.
129. Id. at 719.
130. Id. at 717-20.
131. Compare Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (finding
that a free exercise claim cannot be undermined by the fact that working on Sundays has
become a regular habit); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987)
(holding that denial of unemployment benefits is not justified if claimant bases her objec-
tions on religious beliefs, despite the fact that these beliefs changed during the course of
her employment); with O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (upholding prison
policy which prohibited Muslim prisoners from attending Jumu'ah, a weekly service man-
dated by Muslim scriptures); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (finding generally applica-
ble regulations require merely a showing that they are reasonably necessary to achieve a
legitimate state interest); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (finding the compel-
ling interest test inappropriate in miltary context because military officials must be allowed
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level of scrutiny.132 As a practical matter, however, the Court's deci-
sions were remarkably opaque, producing disparate results in differ-
ent cases. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association,133 the Court retreated from Sherbert and Yoder's broad
recognition of free exercise rights. Without regressing to the days of
Reynolds, the Court followed the middle ground between the broad
and narrow interpretations of the Free Exercise Clause. Under the
Lyng formulation, incidental burdens on religious practices were no
longer exempted from a state's legislative power.'" Instead, religious
conduct would warrant an exemption only if state action coerced an
individual into violating religious beliefs or penalized the individual
for engaging in religious conduct.135 Thus, each plaintiff first had to
show that the legislation imposed a significant burden on him or
her.' 36 Only after this difficult showing was made would strict scrutiny
be applied. 37 In implementing this new approach, the Supreme Court
condoned the government's decision to construct a roadway across
public property that had traditionally been a sacred site for Native
American groups.'
38
In 1990, the Court accelerated its contraction of free exercise
rights sharply with its decision in Employment Division v. Smith.
139
Early on in the opinion, the Smith Court "summarized a century of
the Court's rulings concerning the [F]ree [E]xercise [C]lause."' 40 But
the Smith Court did much more than simply provide a summary of
free exercise jurisprudence. Seizing the opportunity to clarify the am-
biguity of Lyng, the Smith majority shocked the Court-watching world
substantial deference in evaluating whether a particular restriction on religious conduct is
justified).
132. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963). Commentators regard free exercise jurisprudence to be unclear prior to 1990: "Be-
tween 1960 and 1990, Justices of the Supreme Court were sharply divided over the extent
to which the [F]ree [E]xercise [C]lause allowed the judiciary to determine whether a law of
general applicability, which included no explicitly religious criteria, could be applied to
persons whose sincerely held religious beliefs prevented them from complying with the
law." NowAK & ROTUNrDA, supra note 83, at 1218. This changed with the decision in
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990),. to be discussed infra notes 139-152
and accompanying text.
133. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).




138. Id. at 441-42.
139. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Scholars have noted Smith's inconsistency with prior free
exercise decisions. See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. CHi. L. RFv. 1109, 1111 (1990). McConnell argues that Smith's blatant
rejection of prior jurisprudence reflects an intent contrary to that of the Framers of the
First Amendment. Id.
140. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 83, at 1218.
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by holding that generally applicable and facially-neutral laws were no
longer subject to strict scrutiny.
141
In Smith, a private drug rehabilitation organization fired Smith
and others because they ingested peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, for
sacramental purposes at a ceremony of their Native American
Church.142 The state of Oregon denied their applications for unem-
ployment compensation under a law disqualifying employees dis-
charged for work-related "misconduct."' 43 In rejecting Smith's free
exercise challenge to the denial, the Court held that "the right of free
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply
with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground
that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes).""'
Justice Scalia's majority opinion further explained that the only
contexts in which the Court previously found that the First Amend-
ment barred application of neutral, generally applicable laws to relig-
iously motivated action involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone,
but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional
protections or the right of parents to correct the education of their
children.'45 The Smith majority also distinguished the two-step analy-
sis developed in Sherbert as being applicable only to statutes dealing
exclusively with unemployment compensation. 146 Finally, the Court
held that applying a reduced level of scrutiny to neutral, generally ap-
plicable laws is consistent with the standards of scrutiny applied in the
equal protection realm. 47
141. 494 U.S. at 879. Justice O'Connor objected to the Smith majority's characteriza-
tion of the Lyng decision. I. at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring). She hoped to limit Lyng
to cases pertaining to government's management of its internal affairs. Id. Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, saw this as an unnecessary distinction. Id at 885. Why should
government have to tailor its health and safety laws to conform to religious claimants but
not have to tailor its management of public lands, or its administration of welfare pro-
grams, he queried. Id.
142. Id at 872.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)).
145. Id. at 881.
146. Id. at 883.
147. Id. at 886 n.3. In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor asserted that all laws
burdening religious practices should be subject to compelling-interest scrutiny because
"the First Amendment unequivocally makes freedom of religion, like freedom from race
discrimination and freedom of speech, a constitutional 'nor[m],' not an 'anomaly."' The
majority's response to this assertion was: "Just as we subject to the most exacting scrutiny
laws that make classifications based on race, or on the content of speech, so too we strictly
scrutinize governmental classifications based on religion. But we have held that race-neu-
tral laws that have the effect of disproportionately disadvantaging a particular racial group
do not thereby become subject to compelling-interest analysis under the Equal Protection
Clause .... and we have held that generally applicable laws unconcerned with regulating
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As interesting as the Smith majority opinion was the dialogue in
Smith between Justice O'Connor and Justice Blackmun. In rejecting
the majority's adoption of a new standard for free exercise claims,
both vehemently asserted that strict scrutiny should remain the consti-
tutional test.' 8 In addition, both chastized the majority for mis-
characterizing the Court's precedents. 149  However, while both
purported to apply the same compelling interest test, each reached a
different result. Justice O'Connor found that the State of Oregon had
a compelling interest in regulating peyote use by its citizens and that
the claimants' conduct would unduly interfere with the successful exe-
cution of this interest.5 0 In contrast, Justice Blackmun found that,
despite the State's compelling interest in prohibiting peyote use, there
was no justification for the State's denial of an exemption for the reli-
gious claimants. Picking up on the reasoning of Thomas, Justice
Blackmun insisted that "lilt is not the State's broad interest in fighting
the critical 'war on drugs' that must be weighed against respondents'
claim, but the State's narrow interest in refusing to make an exception
for the religious, ceremonial use of peyote." 52 The distinction be-
tween Justice O'Connor's version of the compelling interest test and
that of Justice Blackmun's is subtle, but important. Once Justice
O'Connor found that the State had identified a general compelling
interest that was furthered by the scheme, she looked no further. She
made this decision even in light of evidence that other states had pro-
vided specific exemptions for religious peyote use similar to those
sought by the challengers to Oregon's law. Effectively, her interpreta-
tion of this test eradicated the "narrowly tailored" prong. Justice
Blackmun, on the other hand, insisted that the State not only identify
a compelling interest in the underlying law, but also a separate com-
pelling interest in denying the claimants an exemption. In essence,
Justice Blackmun placed the burden on the State to describe why any
exemptions were not possible. Because the State failed to articulate a
reason, he found in favor of the claimants.
If Congress had adopted Justice O'Connor's version of the com-
pelling interest test in RFRA, the district court's assessment of the
likelihood of success on the merits in Cheema v. Thompson would
have been proper. However, the language and intent of RFRA more
closely reflects Justice Blackmun's vision of Free Exercise Clause re-
speech that have the effect of interfering with speech do not thereby become subject to
compelling-interest analysis under the First Amendment." Id. (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 899-900, 908-09.
149. Id. at 895-98, 908.
150. Id. at 907.
151. Id. at 909.
152. Id. at 909-10.
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quirements than Justice O'Connor's. It is under this reading of RFRA
that Cheema v. Thompson must be understood.
A. Religious Freedom Restoration Act
As noted above,'153 Congress responded to Smith by enacting the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).154 Although
Congress did not explicitly overrule Smith, it rendered the case virtu-
ally meaningless by providing a statutory right to replace the eviscer-
ated constitutional right.155  Introduced by an unlikely coalition of
senators,'156 RFRA garnered overwhelming support in Congress.
157
This strong legislative reaction to Smith was not a surprise to some
scholars. Professor James E. Ryan has noted, "inattention to how
courts have actually been treating the free exercise claimant may ex-
plain why the reaction to Employment Division v. Smith has been so
vehement. '15 8 RFRA is clear in its purposes:
The purposes of this Act are-
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in
Sherbert v. Verner, and Wisconsin v. Yoder and to guarantee its
153. See discussion supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
154. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1995). Congress approved RFRA on November
16, 1993. 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892.
155. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. RFRA addresses Smith's role in free exercise jurisprudence in
its first section, entitled "Findings." Id. The Act specifies that "in Employment Division v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that
the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward reli-
gion," and "the compelling interest test is a workable test for striking balances between
religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests." Id. RFRA's failure to ex-
plicitly overrule Smith maintains its relevance in intrepreting the Free Exercise Clause.
Presumably, if a free exercise case were not brought under RFRA, the Smith standard
would be applied. Furthermore, if RFRA were revoked or declared unconstitutional,
Smith would again control this area of the law. The Ninth Circuit commented on Smith's
relation to RFRA in United States v. Bauer, 75 F.3d 1366, 1374 (1996), noting that "While
implicitly criticizing Smith the statute does not present itself as an interpretation of the
Constitution overruling Smith; rather it consists of a command that must be followed as a
matter of federal law."
156. Senators Edward Kennedy and Orrin Hatch introduced the Act to the 103d Con-
gress on March 11, 1993. S. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1893.
157. Congressional support included members of both political parties with vastly vary-
ing ideologies. The number of co-sponsors indicates its unusually strong appeal in the
Senate: Senators Akaka, Bennett, Bond, Boxer, Bradley, Breaux, Brown, Bumpers, Camp-
bell, Coats, Cohen, Danforth, Daschle, DeConcini, Dodd, Dorgan, Durenberger, Exon,
Feingold, Feinstein, Glenn, Graham, Gregg, Harkin, Hatfield, Inouye, Jeffords, Kas-
sebaum, Kempthorne, Kerrey, Kerry, Kohl, Lautenberg, Levin, Lieberman, Lugar, Mack,
McConnell, Metzenbaum, Mikulski, Moseley-Braun, Moynihan, Murray, Nickles,
Packwood, Pell, Pryor, Reid, Riegle, Rockefeller, Sarbanes, Sasser, Specer, Wellstone, and
Wofford. 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1893.
158. James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act: An Icono-
clastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. Rnv. 1407, 1408 (1992) (footnote omitted).
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application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substan-
tially burdened; and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose reli-
gious exercise is substantially burdened by government.' 5 9
Section 2000bb-1 of RFRA sets forth the compelling interest test:
(a) In general. Government shall not substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection
(b).
(b) Exception. Government may substantially burden a per-
son's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application
of the burden to the person-
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compel-
ling governmental interest. 6
Reaction to RFRA has varied. Like Smith itself,' 6 ' RFRA has
produced a host of legal scholarship. Some have argued that the Act
is outside the realm of Congress' constitutional authority; in essence,
the Act is premised on power which Congress simply lacks. 62 Others
have argued that the Act reinstates ambiguous case law and thus inad-
equately addresses the concerns that find expression in the Free Exer-
cise Clause.' 63 Others have critiqued RFRA by accusing Congress of
ignoring the declining confidence in the Sherbert test readily apparent
159. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (citations omitted).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
161. For diverging viewpoints regarding Smith, compare Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the
Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U.
PA. L. REv. 555, 609 (1991) (arguing that Smith was incorrectly decided) with Mark
Tishnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 117, 122 (1993)
(while not endorsing Smith, arguing that it merely clarified free exercise law).
162. See, e.g., Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment: Congress, Sec-
tion 5, and the RFRA, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1539, 1539-1633 (1995). Others have defended its
constitutional validity. See, ag., Note, The Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993:
Restoring Religious Freedom After the Destruction of the Free Exercise Clause, 20 DAYToN
L. REv. 383, 416-22 (1994). The Fifth Circuit rejected a challenge to RFRA's constitution-
ality in Flores v. Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (1996).
163. Saison, supra note 99, at 672-86. Saison contends that, "RFRA therefore repre-
sents a movement backward. Any solution to the problems surrounding the compelling
interest test must account for the emergence of the Smith doctrine, and strive to forestall
its reemergence. Merely reversing the decision and restoring pre-Smith case law only per-
petuates the problem." Id. at 685. Saison traces the ambiguous reasoning of pre-Smith
free exercise jurisprudence and concludes that the compelling interest test is insufficient to
address the problems within this area of constitutional law. See id. at 672-74, 683-86. She
argues that this ambiguity results in entirely too much judicial discretion. Id. at 656. In-
stead, Saison suggests that the Free Exercise Clause needs the categorical balancing ap-
proach adopted by free speech jurisprudence. Id. at 686-90.
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in pre-Smith case law. 164 Professor James Ryan has argued that it is
the role of the legislature, and not the courts, to preserve religious
liberty.165
On the other hand, other scholars have praised Congress for rein-
stating the compelling interest test in the free exercise domain. These
scholars have recognized the importance of judicially mandated ex-
emptions, 66 argued that an exemption approach best reflects the
Framers' intent,167 opined that the Sherbert and Yoder test is the most
appropriate balance between the rights of government and religious
claimants,'16 and suggested that, without this protection, minority reli-
gious groups would be hurt the most.
69
164. Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith and the Decline of Supreme Court
Centrism, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 259, 271-72 (1993).
165. Ryan, supra note 158.
166. See David E. Steinberg, Rejecting the Case Against the Free Exercise Exemption: A
Critical Assessment, 75 B.U. L. REv. 241 (1995).
167. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise
of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1437-46 (1990). According to McConnell, exemp-
tions were critical to the rise of early evangelical groups in the late 1700s. With regard to
granting exemptions, these groups, such as the Baptists and Quakers, were the subject of
the Framers' intent. Id. at 1446. James Madison is among the most notable Framers who
argued for judicial exemptions for religious purposes: "We maintain therefore that in mat-
ters of Religion, no man's right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society, and that
Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance." James Madison, Memorial and Remon-
strance Against Religious Assessments, in 2 WrrNGs OF JAMES MADISON 183, 185, quoted
in Steinberg, supra note 166, at 266 n.122. But see MIcHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGION AND
POLrrITcs 37 (1978). Malbin argues that the Framers' intent reflects a desire to permit
legislative exemptions, but not judicial exemptions. Id, at 39.
168. Professor Douglas Laycock testified to the suitability of the compelling interest
test to congressional intent:
The stringency of the compelling interest test makes sense in light of its origins: it
is a judicially implied exception to the constitutional text. The Constitution does
not say that government may prohibit free exercise for compelling reasons.
Rather, the Constitution says absolutely that there shall be 'no law' prohibiting
free exercise. The implied exception is based on necessity, and its rationale runs
no further than cases of clear necessity. RFRA makes the exception explicit
rather than implicit, but the standard for satisfying the exception should not
change.
Religious Freedom and Restoration Act Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 81-82 (1992) (citations omitted).
169. Professor Kathleen Sullivan warns that the danger of not granting judicial exemp-
tions will be felt most severely by unpopular minority groups who are held hostage by the
whims of a political majority. Kathleen Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U.
CHI. L. REv. 195, 216 (1992). Other scholars echo her sentiment. Professor David Stein-
berg notes "[s]mall, unfamiliar, and unpopular religions face far more uncertain treatment
from the political branches of government. Legislators unfamiliar with a religious group
may pass laws that conflict with the group's tenets. Moreover, a small and insular religious
group may lack the political influence necessary to obtain a statutory exemption." Stein-
berg, supra note 166, at 253-54 (citations omitted).
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Notwithstanding the controversy surrounding RFRA's worth, it
remains valid law today. The proponents of the statute have success-
fully given religious groups one tool to obtain exemptions to practice
their beliefs. For this reason, the statute is far from meaningless.
However, the critics of the Act should not be ignored. They have
pointed out some of the Act's flaws that need to be addressed. Most
notably, they have recognized that by reinstating the case law prior to
Smith, the Act has merely restored the ambiguity prevailing in the
cases during this period. Thus, any suggestions for improving RFRA
should be welcomed.17 In the meantime, however, Cheema v.
Thompson will be decided based on RFRA's current language.
Im. Applying RFRA's Strict Scrutiny Standard to Cheema
v. Thompson
As noted above, the district court denied the Cheemas' request
for a preliminary injunction, grounding its decision on an assessment
of the likelihood of success of the plaintiffs' claim under RFRA.171
Reversing the district court's ruling, the Ninth Circuit declared that a
proper understanding of RFRA required the opposite outcome. 7
RFRA places the burden of proof on the State to show that its
policies are in furtherance of a compelling state interest, and that the
means employed are the least restrictive ones possible. 173 A closer
look at the school district's interest in Cheema v. Thompson indicates
that, although its interest in public safety is compelling, the current
policy it employs is not the least restrictive means possible.
A. The State's Compelling Interests
The district court found that the education of children was a com-
pelling governmental interest,174 and the Ninth Circuit upheld this de-
termination. 7 5 Both courts rooted their conclusion in long-standing
precedent.76 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court recognized that "there
is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility for
education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the con-
trol and duration of basic education. Providing public schools ranks at
170. Proposals for improving RFRA will be introduced in Part V, infra notes 261-308
and accompanying text.
171. Cheema v. Thompson, No. F-94-5360, slip. op. (E.D. Cal. May 27, 1994).
172. Cheema v. Thompson, No. 94-16097, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24160, at *3 (9th Cir.
Sept. 2, 1994).
173. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-l(b)(1)-(2).
174. Cheema v. Thompson, No. F-94-5360, slip. op. at 14-16 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 1994).
175. The opinion states, "The district has a compelling interest in protecting the safety
of its students." Cheema v. Thompson, No. 94-16097, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24160, at *8
(9th Cir. Sept. 2, 1994).
176. Id.
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the very apex of the function of the State.' 177 Similarly, in Sherbert v.
Verner, the Court recognized the protection of public safety to be a
compelling interest.178 Safety in public schools has long been recog-
nized by the political branches of California as an interest of the high-
est order. Moreover, the Livingston School District has a separate
obligation under the California Constitution to ensure its schools are
"safe, secure and peaceful.' 179
Beyond the actual threat to the safety of its students, the school
district argued that avoiding the impact on other children from the
mere presence of kirpans at school should itself suffice as a compelling
interest.180 Specifically, the school district argued that as important as
whether or not the kirpans were actually a threat to safety is the possi-
bility that the kirpans might be perceived as a threat by other students
or might be resented by non-religious students who would like to but
are unable to carry knives.'' This perception itself-whether or not
rational-might create a disruptive environment justifying the broad
"4no weapons" policy. In reviewing the district court's ruling on the
preliminary injunction, the Ninth Circuit found this interest want-
ing,18 observing that the district court's finding that other children
might be frightened by the kirpans, or might think it unfair that only
some children have knives, was purely speculative.'83
The Ninth Circuit's decision on the perception issue is consistent
with a long line of cases involving civil rights and public health.184 In
their brief, counsel for the students cited Buchanan v. Warley, 85 in
which the United States Supreme Court struck down an ordinance
prohibiting African-Americans from settling in Caucasian neighbor-
hoods in Louisville, Kentucky. 186 The city claimed that its ordinance
177. 406 U.S. 205, 213.
178. 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878);
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1904); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1943); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946)).
179. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(c).
180. In a memorandum to the Board of Trustees, staff advised the Board against al-
lowing a "free exercise" exception to the "no weapons" policy on the ground that "we have
a compelling interest to provide our two thousand plus students with an environment
which is perceived to be safe and free of disturbances and distractions to the educational
process." Brief for Appellant at 16 n.14, Cheema v. Thompson, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS
24160 (9th Cir. Sept. 2, 1994) (No. 94-16097).
181. Brief of Respondent at 15-20, Cheema v. Thompson, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24160
(9th Cir. Sept. 2, 1994) (No. 94-16097).
182. Cheema v. Thompson, No. 94-16097, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24160, at *8 (9th Cir.
Sept. 2, 1994).
183. Id. at *8 n.2.
184. Brief for Appellant at 27-28, Cheema v. Thompson, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24160
(9th Cir. Sept.2, 1994) (No. 94-16097).
185. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
186. lIL
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was intended to "promote the public peace by preventing race con-
flicts."187 The Court rejected that argument, stating "desirable as this
is, and important as is the preservation of the public peace, this aim
cannot be accomplished by laws... which deny rights created or pro-
tected by the Federal Constitution."'188 Additionally, as the Cheemas
pointed out, courts have consistently refused to allow school districts
to exclude AIDS-afflicted children from attending classes, despite a
rampant and undeniable fear in the communities of possible spread of
the disease.'8 9
Particularly relevant to the legitimacy of the State's perception
argument is Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjust-
ment.90 In that case, a district court held that RFRA prevents a zon-
ing board from restricting the location of a church's soup kitchen
because of "unfounded, or irrational fears of certain residents."'191
When we apply this case to Cheema, the key question becomes
whether the perceived fears in the Livingston schools are "unfounded
or irrational." The Ninth Circuit found that the "[school] district has
provided no evidence that any of its students are afraid of or upset by
kirpans."'t1 The record is thus devoid of any support offered by the
school district that it has conducted any study to assess the perceived
fears by other students that it alleges. 93 In the second appeal, that
involving the terms of the preliminary injunction, the Ninth Circuit
specifically commented on the lack of evidence presented by the
school district.' 94 Judge Hall wrote, "[i]f the school district dislikes
the injunction, it should use its opportunity to litigate this dispute on
the merits to present the district court with adequate evidence from
which a fully informed decision can be made."'
95
To counter these arguments, the school district argued that it
should have broad discretion in enacting policies that further the legit-
187. Id. at 81.
188. Id.
189. Brief for Appellant at 28, Cheema v. Thompson, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24160 (9th
Cir. Sept. 2, 1994) (No. 94-16097) (citing Ray v. School Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Fla.
1987); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Doe v.
Dolton Elementary Sch. Dist., 694 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1988)).
190. 849 F. Supp. 77 (D.D.C. 1994).
191. Id. at 79.
192. Cheema v. Thompson, No. 94-16097, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24160, at *9 (9th Cir.
Sept. 2, 1994).
193. Conducting such a factual or statistical inquiry would be difficult without alarming
students, which is exactly what the school district is trying to avoid. Nevertheless, there is
no evidence in the record that the district has made any effort to show that there is any sort
of a perceived threat among the students themselves. It has merely asserted that this per-
ceived threat is a compelling interest without showing that this perception of a threat even
exists.
194. Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883, 885 (9th Cir. 1995).
195. Id. at 886.
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imate goals of an educational system. Specifically, it pointed to free
speech doctrine by analogy, relying in particular on Bethel School Dis-
trict v. Fraser'96 and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. 197
The issue of a school district's ability to curb the expressive activ-
ity of its students was first addressed in Tinker v. Des Moines In-
dependent Community School District.98 In Tinker, the Court held
that a student who wished to exercise his free speech rights by wearing
a black armband could not be prevented from doing so, despite the
fact that his speech might have some disruptive effect on the educa-
tional atmosphere. The Court emphatically stated that "students in
the public schools do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."'
1 99
In Fraser, the Court held that a school district could, consistent
with the First Amendment, discipline a student for using lewd and
indecent speech in public discourse.2°° The Fraser Court distinguished
a state's power to regulate adult speech from its power over children
at public school.201 It declared that a student rights are not "automati-
cally coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings."
2°
In Hazelwood, former high school student staff members of a
school's newspaper alleged that their school district violated the First
Amendment by deleting portions of a particular issue of the paper. In
holding that the district did not violate the First Amendment, the
Court began by reviewing its prior decisions. The Court contrasted its
holding in Tinker with its holding in Fraser and found that Hazelwood
resembled Fraser more closely than Tinker. Important to the Hazel-
wood Court's holding was the school district's role as a publisher of
the newspaper, which raised the possibility that people might attribute
the views espoused in it to the school. 203 The Court reasoned that,
while the First Amendment may require a school to tolerate particular
student speech, it does not necessarily require a school affirmatively
to promote particular student speech.2 4
The school district in Cheema argues that this line of free speech
cases underscores the broad discretion districts enjoy in furthering
their educational goals. This discretion, the district goes on, counsels
in favor of finding the district's asserted interests to be compelling.
The district court in Cheema, looking to Fraser and Hazelwood, seized
196. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
197. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
198. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
199. Id at 506.
200. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680.
201. Id at 682.
202. Id.
203. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-72.
204. Id at 270-71.
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upon this reasoning in reaching its decision.20 5 It held that in deter-
mining whether the school had a compelling interest in pursuing its
policies, courts must be mindful that school officials should have the
authority to regulate and control the school environment in a manner
consistent with the school's educational mission.20 6
Although the Ninth Circuit neglected to directly address this is-
sue in either of their majority opinions,20 7 the district court's reliance
on Hazelwood and Fraser was surely misguided. First, both Fraser and
Hazelwood can be easily distinguished. The Fraser Court's decision
turned on the fact that the speech involved was lewd and indecent and
aimed at a captive audience of minors.20 8 Indeed, the Court there dis-
tinguished Tinker by recognizing that the sexual content of the speech
given to a captive audience rendered it inherently disruptive.20 9 In
contrast, the actions of the Cheemas are not lewd and are in no other
way inherently disruptive, particularly in light of the fact that the
kirpans, as worn, are not readily visible. 0 In Hazelwood, the Court
focused on the role of the school as a publisher, and declared that
First Amendment rights do not require the school district to promote
a particular type of speech. In the case at hand, permitting the
Cheemas to wear kirpans in no way requires the school to endorse or
promote a particular religion or religious act.21'
Furthermore, while these cases are somewhat analogous to
Cheema, they have no precedential value in free exercise jurispru-
dence. The line of cases interpreting the meaning of the Free Exercise
Clause is distinct from free speech jurisprudence, and there is no rea-
son to believe that the two should overlap. In fact, if Congress had
wanted RFRA to reflect the reasoning applied in free speech cases, it
would have explicitly done so. Instead, in the Act itself, Congress re-
ferred only to prior free exercise cases.21 2
205. Cheema v. Thompson, No. F-94-5360, slip. op. at 15 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 1994).
206. I&
207. Cheema v. Thompson, No. 94-16097, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24160 (9th Cir. Sept.
2, 1994); Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883 (1995). In his dissent, Judge Wiggins took note
of Fraser and Hazelwood's applicability to the case at hand. He reminded the majority
that, "[I]n the interest of safe school environments, students enjoy fewer rights than adults,
or even than children outside of classrooms." Cheema, 67 F.3d at 892 (citation omitted).
208. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680.
209. Id. at 680-81.
210. If the school district's argument that perception of fear among the students is ac-
cepted, then arguably, this might be deemed inherently disruptive. However, the tenuous
character of this argument counsels against such a finding. See supra notes 180-195 and
accompanying text.
211. In all likelihood, such school endorsement would amount to a violation of the Es-
tablishment Clause.
212. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1).
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To summarize, in Cheema v. Thompson, the Livingston Union
School District has argued two separate compelling interests. The first
is a threat to public safety. The Court has consistently held this to be
compelling.213 The second, the perception of a threat, is an interest
significantly more tenuous. Absent further evidence of the existence
of such a threat, it is unlikely that this interest will be, or should be,
considered compelling. 214 But even assuming that either, or both, in-
terests were compelling, RFRA's analysis does not stop there.
B. Least Restrictive Means
The second part of the RFRA standard requires that, even when
a state enacts a regulation infringing the free exercise of religion in
furtherance of a compelling interest, the means employed must be the
least restrictive possible.21 The means employed by the Livingston
Union School District was a broad policy prohibiting all weapons.21 6
A knife is included in the definition of a weapon.217 Proving that this
policy is the least restrictive one under RFRA is the most difficult part
of the school district's task in Cheema.
The Ninth Circuit found that the school district had not accom-
plished that task; it held that the blanket provision enacted by the
district was not the least restrictive means of effectuating the goal of
school safety.218 The court noted that the school district "has put in
the record no evidence whatsoever of any attempt to accommodate
the Cheemas' religious practices. '21 9 After the case was remanded to
the district court to formulate the specific terms of the injunction, the
district court found a less restrictive way to accommodate both the
state's interests and the Cheemas, and incorporated this less restric-
213. See supra notes 174-179 and accompanying text.
214. See discussion supra notes 178-195 and accompanying text.
215. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b)(2).
216. The California Penal Code makes it a crime to carry a knife with a blade longer
than 2.5 inches on school property. CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.10(a). The school district
policy is in accord with this state provision.
217. The Cheemas contend that the mere characterization of the kirpan as a knife mis-
states the issue at hand. According to the students, the kirpan is not a knife but a ceremo-
nial object, not to be used as a weapon, but as a religious symbol: "[tihe fact that [the
kirpan] could be misused to attempt to inflict harm does not alter that circumstance, or
change the nature of a kirpan [which is a sacred symbol]." Brief for Appellant at 22,
Cheema v. Thompson, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24160 (9th Cir. Sept. 2, 1994) (No. 94-16097)
(emphasis omitted). Counsel for the students also point out that other objects, such as
scissors, baseball bats, or acid in a chemistry lab, when viewed apart from their primary
functions, may also be considered weapons, yet the school district's policy does not pro-
hibit the use of these items on school grounds. Id. at 24.
218. Cheema v. Thompson, No. 94-16097, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24160, at *11 (9th Cir.
Sept. 2, 1994).
219. Id. at *10.
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tive means in its order to the school district.220 The school district's
appeal of this order proved to be futile for the same reasons the Ninth
Circuit initially ruled against the school district. The Ninth Circuit's
second opinion spelled out the basic problem with the school district's
case:
We concluded, as did the district court, that the school district
had a compelling interest in campus safety. We even agreed that
the kirpan ban served that interest, despite the almost total lack
of evidentiary support in the record. But we simply could not
conclude that nothing short of a wholesale ban would ade-
quately protect student safety. The problem was a total failure
of proof; the school district refused to produce any evidence
whatever to demonstrate the lack of a less restrictive
alternative.22'
The court further admonished the school district for taking the
position, before both the district court and the panel, that it had no
obligation to offer a less restrictive means,2 2 2 characterizing it as
"quite mistaken." 23
Instead of providing a less restrictive means of accomplishing
their stated policies, the school district has suggested a "compromise"
to the situation. Rather than permit actual kirpans to be worn, the
district suggested that the students wear a kirpan medallion.224 This
suggestion was rejected by the Cheemas as not comporting with the
mandates of their religion.2' As a result, the Ninth Circuit found it
not to be a viable compromise.226 Later, in the school district's ap-
peal, the appellate court ignored this proposal altogether. The school
district's offer for such a compromise demonstrates its lack of under-
standing of the issue at hand. Instead of accommodating the
Cheemas' religious practices, they asked the Cheemas to modify a
fundamental tenet of their religion. In return, there was never any
attempt to alter its own policy to make it less restrictive on the man-
dates of Sikhism. Beyond this suggestion, the district failed to provide
any other alternative, whether acceptable or not.
The school district's seeming reluctance to accommodate the
Cheemas' exercise of their religion is directly contrary to the decision
of other contiguous school districts. The factual record shows that
both "the Yuba and Live Oak School Districts allow kirpans, but only
220. Cheema v. Thompson, No. F-94.5360, slip. op. at 12-13 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 1994).
221. Cheema, 67 F.3d at 885 (citations and emphasis omitted).
222. Id
223. Id.
224. Cheema v. Thompson, No. 94-16097, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24160, at *10 n.3 (9th
Cir. Sept. 2, 1994).
225. I&
226. Id
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if they are riveted to their sheaths."2 7 The Selma School District's
approach has been to allow them as long as the kirpans' tips and edges
are rounded. 8 The Ninth Circuit made special note of these facts:
This time the school district could not rely on our common sense
to save it. Indeed, common sense cut against the school district.
The simple fact-documented in the record-was that other
school districts with a Khalsa Sikh population had managed to
accommodate kirpans without sacrificing student safety. For ex-
ample, the record included the policies of two California school
districts, which allowed kirpans so long as the blades were
dulled, no more than 2 1/2 inches, and securely riveted to their
sheaths. The natural question was why the same compromise
would not work here. The school district gave us no answer.229
These alternatives indicate that there are less restrictive means to
further the school district's compelling interest. Furthermore, the
Cheemas themselves proposed another alternative: they agreed to
wear shorter kirpans sewn into the sheaths in such a manner that even
an adult could not remove them absent taking apart each stitch indi-
vidually. As to this apparent compromise, the Ninth Circuit observed
that "[t]he district has failed to show why these less restrictive alterna-
tives are insufficient."' 2 0
The Livingston School District's response was two-fold. First, it
argued that RFRA requires only that the State have the burden of
providing the least restrictive means at trial, not at the preliminary
injunction stage.23' Second, even if the kirpans are worn in their
sheaths as the plaintiffs offered, removing them will merely be diffi-
cult, not impossible. 32
The Ninth Circuit rejected the school district's first argument.233
The court noted that on a motion for preliminary injunction, the court
is to consider the likelihood of success on the merits.2 4 The success of
the merits of this case is significantly related to the allocation of the
burden of proof at trial. Furthermore, RFRA explicitly states that
once a person's religion has been substantially burdened by the gov-
ernment, it is up to the government to provide a compelling justifica-
tion and the least restrictive means possible.235 The importance of the
227. Id. at *11 nA.
228. Id.
229. Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d at 885 n.3.
230. Cheema v. Thompson, No. 94-16097, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24160, at *11 n.4 (9th
Cir. Sept. 2, 1994).
231. Brief of Respondent at 19, Cheema v. Thompson, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24160
(9th Cir. Sept. 2, 1994) (No. 94-16097).
232. Id. at 16-17.
233. Cheema v. Thompson, No. 94-16097, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24160, at *4-5.
234. Id. at *3-*4. See also Glider v. PGA Tour Inc., 936 F.2d 417, 422 (9th Cir. 1991).
235. 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-l(a)-(b).
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burden of proof renders consideration of the "least restrictive means"
prong of RFRA critical in assessing a motion for preliminary
injunction.
As to the second argument, although the school district posits
that removal of the kirpans from their sheaths for violent use is possi-
ble, it failed to provide an example of such an occurrence in the rec-
ord.36 Mere speculation has never been sufficient justification for the
denial of a First Amendment right.' 7 So, although the use of a kirpan
by students for violent ends is possible, there is no evidence to suggest
that it is likely.
The school district's best argument seems to be that the presence
of kirpans causes fear among students and that such a fear can be
allayed only with an absolute prohibition of kirpans. However, this
argument is premised on the notion that the prevention of fear among
students is a compelling interest of the state. 238 If eradicating the
presence of kirpans on school property is itself a compelling interest,
then it is doubtful that there are any less restrictive means to further
such a purpose. If, however, it is not a compelling interest, as the
Ninth Circuit seems to indicate,239 then the school district's absolute
ban on the kirpans is certainly not the least restrictive alternative.
Cheema v. Thompson demonstrates how the important second
prong of RFRA has the potential to be watered down. In its initial
denial of the Cheemas' motion for preliminary injunction, the district
court ignored that requirement altogether. 40 Once the district court
236. The lack of evidence to support the use of kirpans for violent purposes is dis-
cussed, infra at note 258.
237. The school district has failed to provide evidence of any injury yet to be sustained.
The school district responds by arguing that their policy is a preventative measure. Brief of
Respondent at 14-25, Cheema v. Thompson, No. 94-16097, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24160,
(9th Cir. Sept. 2, 1994). This demonstrates exactly how the school district has missed the
point. Under Smith, the school district could have pointed to its preventative intent and
rested its case because this policy is a neutral, generally applicable law. However, RFRA
alters the school district's duties. Under RFRA, when infringing on the plaintiff's rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment, the state must show more than that its policies are
simply preventative. The state must show that these policies are in furtherance of a com-
pelling interest and are the least restrictive. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b).
238. This is likely to be an unsuccessful argument, as discussed supra at notes 180-191
and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit found this argument to be unpersuasive, espe-
cially in light of the fact that the district provided no evidence that students were in fact
fearful of the presence of kirpans. Cheema v, Thompson, No. 94-16097, 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 24160, at *8-*9 (9th Cir. Sept. 2, 1994).
239. See supra notes 180-195 and accompanying text.
240. Cheema, 67 F.3d at 885. The Ninth Circuit was not shy about spelling out the
district court's misgivings. In its opinion, it stated that "[t]he district court ... simply
declared that the absolute ban was necessary to protect the school district's compelling
interest in, among other things, student safety. The district court's failure to consider
RFRA's 'no less restrictive alternative' requirement left us no choice but to reverse." Id
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found that there was a compelling interest in school safety, it looked
no further. 241 It simply denied the motion and validated the absolute
prohibition on the kirpans. Ignoring the narrow tailoring requirement
will unduly sacrifice the religious rights of minority adherents to the
will of the majority. This is precisely what RFRA and the First
Amendment 242 are designed to avoid.
IV. The Social and Legal Repercussions of Cheema v.
Thompson on Future Free Exercise Claims
The school district's appellate brief asks "who will console the
parents and siblings of the first child who is injured as a result of the
presence of the kirpan knives on school grounds? '243 This question
strikes at the heart of this case. The idea of children being the targets
of potential violence arouses a sense of grave concern for all parents.
These fears are not unwarranted.
The statistics of school violence are shocking. "Eighty-two per-
cent of school district officials recently reported that student violence
had increased over the last five years."'2 4' A recent study noted that
39.9 percent of male Virginia high school students carried a weapon to
school during a one month period.245 Between July 1, 1992, and May
26, 1994, seventy-four intentional deaths occurred on school campuses
in Virginia alone. 46 Another study conducted in Memphis, Tennessee
indicated that knives were the weapon of choice for eighth and elev-
enth graders.2 47 Specifically, 10.9 percent of the eighth graders sur-
veyed and 14.4 percent of the eleventh graders surveyed carried
241. The fact that it initially failed to grant the Cheemas' motion demonstrates that the
district court misunderstood both the second prong of RFRA's standard and the fact that
the ultimate burden of proof of the regulation is on the state, not on the challengers.
242. Justice O'Connor elegantly expressed this idea in her concurring opinion in Smith:
"fT]he First Amendment was enacted precisely to protect the rights of those whose reli-
gious practices are not shared by the majority and may be viewed with hostility. The his-
tory of our free exercise doctrine amply demonstrates the harsh impact majoritarian rule
has had on unpopular or emerging religious groups." Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 902 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
243. Brief of Respondent at 6, Cheema v. Thompson, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24160 (9th
Cir. Sept. 2, 1994) (No. 94-16097).
244. David S. Gehrig, Note, The Gun-Free School Zones AcL The Shootout Over Legis-
lative Findings, the Commerce Clause, and Federalism, 22 HASTINGs CONST. L.Q. 179, 180
(1994) (citing Amicus Brief for the National School Safety Center at 4, United States v.
Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993) and NAT'L SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOC., VIOLENCE IN THE
SCHooLs: How AMERICA'S SCHOOL BOARDS ARE SAFEGUARDING OUR CHILDREN
(1993)).
245. Id. (citing VIRGINIA DEP'T OF EDUC., 1992 YOUTH RISK BEHAVIOR SURVEY RE-
PORT 8).
246. Id.
247. Cornell Christion, Most City School Students Feel Safe, but Anxiety Rises with
Class, Study Says, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis), Sept. 18, 1994, at IA.
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knives to school.248 In a 1992 report by the American School Health
Association, the national average of incidents of fighting among
eighth graders had skyrocketed to 44.3 percent.24 9 In San Diego, "the
number of chains, razor blades, knives, sharpened screwdrivers, and
the like taken from local school kids totaled 133" during the 1991-92
school year.2 5° Even the Supreme Court has taken notice of the prob-
lem of school violence. More than a decade ago, in New Jersey v.
T.L. O.,251 the Court noted that "school disorder has often taken par-
ticularly ugly forms: drug use and violent crime in the schools have
become major social problems." 2
Cheema v. Thompson has been the focus of much public outcry,
generally in support of the school district policy. One commentator,
in criticizing both the Ninth Circuit and RFRA, inquired:
Must a school district have adult escorts for Sikh schoolchildren
to insure kirpans are neither used nor become provocative?
Must there be at least one sanguinary encounter with its 4-inch
blade before a prohibition can be justified? If the RFRA de-
nounces school authorities for assuming without expensive em-
pirical studies that knives accessible to children are an
omnipresent danger and that a 4-inch blade concentrates the
student mind wonderfully on nonscholastic self-defense, isn't
the law "a ass, a idiot," to quote from Mr. Bumble in "Oliver
Twist,,? 253
Some parents of children within the Livingston Union School
District are also opposed to the Ninth Circuit's decision. A group of
parents has publicly stated that "[a]ll children have the right to be in a
safe learning environment and to feel safe in the classrooms, on the
school buses and playgrounds without any threat, intimidation or
harm .... Allowing children to wear weapons to school is only con-
doning, enforcing and contributing to more violence." 4 Even Judge
Hall, who concurred in the Ninth Circuit's initial opinion on the pre-
liminary injunction and later wrote the opinion affirming the district
court's order following remand, expressed some doubt about the
Cheemas' case. Fearing the frightening realities of school violence,
Judge Hall "expressed concerns that districts in less rural venues
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Jeanne F. Brooks, It's Back to the Books-and the Guns: Weapons a Fact of Life at
Today's Schools, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 3, 1993, at Al.
251. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
252. Id at 339.
253. Bruce Fein, Religious Freedom's Cutting Edge, WASH. TIMEs, Sept. 14, 1994, at
A16.
254. Vicki Wright, et al., No kirpans in Schools, FRESNO BEE, June 14, 1994, at B6.
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might be undermined in their efforts to enforce their own policies. ' '2 -5
Judge Charles Wiggins, who dissented in both the Ninth Circuit deci-
sions, echoed Hall's sentiment: "While a 'rational Sikh child' might
not unsheathe his kirpan... the real concern is that an 'abnormal'
child might use the knife to do harm. 'That is the menace that the
legislation is aimed at."' 56 In addition to bucking public sentiment,
allowing Sikh students to carry kirpans to school will pose a serious
problem of enforcement. It will be difficult for school districts to pa-
trol students and determine which students possess kirpans in further-
ance of a religious beliefs and which students do not.
The social repercussions of Cheema also include the prospect of
other challengers requesting additional exemptions for more danger-
ous weapons. Essentially, Cheema might open the floodgates of litiga-
tion. What will stop a religious cult from claiming that its religion
mandates that its members must carry handguns on school grounds?
Or less drastic but more realistic, what will stop more devout Sikhs
than the Cheemas from claiming that the kirpans sewn into their
sheaths do not satisfy Sikhism's requirements? Effective legal stan-
dards (both legislatively enacted, and judicially created) should ad-
dress these issues clearly and succinctly when they arise.
257
Yet the argument supported by such fears is undermined by the
fact that there have been no reported incidents of the kirpan being
used for violent purposes on school grounds. In the end, the evidence
regarding incidents of violent kirpan use away from school grounds is
conflicting.58 Furthermore, public fear has never been the sole justifi-
255. Hannah Nordhaus, Religious Freedom at Issue as 9th Circuit Debates Kirpan Case,
THE RECORDER, Aug. 12, 1994, at 2.
256. Id.
257. The creation of clearer standards than designated by RFRA will be addressed in
Part V, infra notes 267-295 and accompanying text. To combat the fear that granting ex-
emptions for religious claimants may open the floodgates of litigation, there will need to be
additional checks to ensure that frivolous, secular claims are denied. The Court has, in the
past, rejected a state's argument that the cumulative effect of claims similar to the petition-
ers' justifies denying a free exercise exemption. See Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employ-
ment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 835 (1989). See also Lupu, supra note 97 at 947. ("Behind every
free exercise claim is a spectral march; grant this one, a voice whispers to each judge, and
you will be confronted with an endless chain of exemption demands from religious devi-
ants of every stripe."). This issue will also be addressed in Part V, infra notes 261-295 and
accompanying text.
258. Because there is a dearth of evidence regarding violent kirpan use in the United
States, both parties look to evidence in Canada. However, evaluation of this evidence also
fosters debate. The Cheemas claim that there "is no record of an association between
kirpans and violence, and there is no record of kirpans being used inappropriately." Brief
for Appellant at 10, Cheema v. Thompson, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24160 (9th Cir. Sept. 2,
1994) (No. 94-16097) (citing R. at 266). The school district, in contrast, submits that there
have been instances of violent kirpan use in Canada. In their brief, they allege that:
910 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23:877
cation for judicial decisionmaking, nor should it be.259 A judgment
against the Cheemas may also produce grave social consequences.
For example, allowing the school district to restrict the free exercise of
their religion is directly contrary to the First Amendment, Smith
notwithstanding. The plain meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, not
to mention its spirit, protects the Cheemas' desire to engage in the
religious practices of their choice. A judgment for the school district
would epitomize a society increasingly less tolerant of religious differ-
ences and unwilling to accommodate or learn about these differences,
even where the Constitution seems to require such accommodation.
Thus, no matter what its outcome, Cheema v. Thompson will have
great social ramifications. Consequently, it must be argued, analyzed,
and decided with solid legal reasoning. In the end, a decision in
Cheema as legal precedent may go well beyond the immediate effect
on the Livingston Union School District or Cheema family.
Complicating matters further is the fact that this case is one of the
first tests of RFRA.260 If the Cheemas succeed on the merits of this
case, it will open up greater opportunity for religious groups to chal-
lenge governmental policies burdening the free exercise of religion.
As a practical matter, anyone who feels that a governmental policy
interferes with his or her ability to freely exercise his or her religious
beliefs will ask the government to explain why its compelling interest
would not be served if he or she is granted an exemption from the
regulation. To avoid such challenges, states may enact more specific
policies, including a greater array of exemptions. Essentially, a
Cheema victory will require the government to articulate a compelling
interest in denying exemptions to their policies to certain religious
groups, and further, to narrowly tailor these policies so that they em-
ploy the least restrictive means to further this compelling interest.
On the other hand, if the court awards judgment to the Living-
ston Union School District, governmental entities will be able to enact
broad, facially neutral policies as long as they can articulate an under-
lying compelling interest. In essence, RFRA's second prong, requir-
ing the "least restrictive means," will be read out of the statute.
Without a strong second prong, few exemptions from such policies
need to be granted. This watered down reading of RFRA would be
There have been in the Metropolitan Toronto area, three reported incidents of
violent kirpan use. One involved a plea of guilty to attempted murder after a
stabbing with a kirpan. In one street fight, a man was stabbed in the back with a
kirpan. On [sic] one case, a kirpan was drawn for defensive purposes.
Brief of Respondent at 12, Cheema (No. 94-16097) (citing R. at 21).
259. See discussion supra notes 184-191 and accompanying text.
260. Hannah Nordhaus, Are They Missing the Point?; The Sikh Community Says a
School's Refusal to Let Their Children Carry Religious Knives Violates the First Amend-
ment, THE RECORDER, Aug. 11, 1994, at 1.
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inconsistent with congressional intent. Thus, to prevent such a result,
RFRA should be amended to address the concerns raised in Cheema
v. Thompson.
V. Amending RFRA to Further Its Purposes
Amending RFRA requires that we address three relevant ques-
tions. First, why was it enacted? Second, how should it be amended?
And finally, how will amending it better serve its purposes?
A. The Purpose of RFRA
When Congress enacted RFRA, it sought to explicitly reinstate
the compelling interest standard found in cases prior to Smith.
2 61
However, its text and legislative history indicate that it was designed
to do more than merely require the states to articulate a compelling
interest. The House of Representatives Report states: "Seemingly
reasonable regulations based upon speculation, exaggerated fears of
thoughtless policies cannot stand. Officials must show that the rele-
vant regulations are the least restrictive means of protecting a compel-
ling governmental interest. '2 62 Specifically, Congress meant to ensure
that the second prong (the "least restrictive means" requirement) was
as important as the first prong.
263
Furthermore, in restoring the compelling interest test established
in Sherbert and Yoder, Congress recognized that the test used in those
two cases was significantly stronger than the test the Court applied in
other free exercise cases.2" Sherbert and Yoder represent the zenith
of free exercise jurisprudence, where religious plaintiffs who sought to
have their individual claims balanced against government interests ac-
tually prevailed. 265 Notwithstanding the symbolic value of referring to
Sherbert and Yoder, some of the drafters of the statute expressed res-
ervation at RFRA's specific language. They found that the language
did not adequately reflect their desire to provide strong protections
for free exercise claimants. For example, Senator Hyde, writing addi-
tional comments to the House Report on RFRA noted the inade-
quacy of RFRA as enacted: "Restoration of the pre-Smith standard,
although politically practical, will likely prove, over time, to be an in-
sufficient remedy. It would have been preferable, given the unique
opportunity presented by this legislation, to find a solution that would
give solid protection to religious claimants against unnecessary gov-
261. 42 U.S.C. 2000bb(b)(1).
262. H. R. REP. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1993).
263. Ma
264. Id. at 15.
265. Id.
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ernment intrusion. ' 266 It appears from this statement that Senator
Hyde understood the inconsistent nature of free exercise jurispru-
dence in the pre-Smith era. Yet he offered no suggestions to remedy
the problems he anticipated. What we are left with, then, is a clear
congressional desire to vigorously protect religious autonomy, and
statutory language whose ambiguity may undermine that objective.
B. The Proposed Amendments
The expansive protection desired by Senator Hyde is not possible
without specific exemptions for particular religious practices, a solu-
tion which is both expensive and impractical if Congress were to try to
set out the details in the Act. However, Congress' desire for such con-
crete protection can be implemented by courts and local governments.
These entities may do this by allowing exemptions to stated poli-
cies. 267 Either the local governments could carve out exemptions to
their own legislation, or in the alternative, courts could formulate judi-
cial exemptions to state legislation. Although judicial and legislative
exemptions are entirely separate matters and raise different constitu-
tional implications, their effect on religious claimants is similar. Thus,
for the purposes of RFRA, they will be addressed together.
The foregoing suggests that section 2000bb-l(b) of RFRA should
be explicit in stating that "[g]overnment may substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of
the burden to the person, or denying an exemption for that particular
person is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and is
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
266. Id. at 16.
267. In response to Cheema, California Senate President Pro Tempore Bill Lockyer
introduced a bill which would create an exemption for Sikh students carrying kirpans to
school. Calif. S.B. 89, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. § 626.10(g) (1993). Following amendments in the
Assembly on June 14, 1994, July 7, 1994, and August 23, 1994, the language of the bill
provided for a specific legislative exemption for those similarly situated to the Cheemas.
Specifically, in subsection (g), the provisions of the bill sought to amend the CAL. PENAL
CODE § 626.10 to read: "Subdivisions (A) and (B) [referring to the prohibition of weapons
on school grounds] shall not apply to the carrying of any knife or dagger that is an integral
part of a recognized religious practice. In order for this subdivision to apply to a minor at a
school referred to under subdivision (A), a parent or guardian of a minor shall give notice
to the appropriate school authority that the minor meets the criteria under this subdivision.
However, an emancipated minor may give his or her own notice." Id. The bill continued
by imposing a caveat to this amendment: "The exemption provided by this subdivision
shall not be construed to prevent a school district from imposing additional reasonable
conditions or standards pertaining to the lawful possession of a dirk or dagger when that
possession is an integral part of a recognized religious practice." Id. Governor Pete Wil-
son vetoed this bill on September 30,1994. Greg Lucas, Wilson Veto For Knives At Schoo"
Children Wear Daggers as Part of Sikh Faith, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 1, 1994, at A19.
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interest."
268
Furthermore, RFRA must address the concern that granting such
exemptions will result in abuse by those who will claim religious pur-
poses to mask secular desires to carry weapons. To allay these fears,
RFRA should require that the religious practice be part of a sincerely
held religious belief.269
The requirement that free exercise claimants show sincerity of
their beliefs is not new to free exercise jurisprudence. In fact, courts
already require claimants to show a level of sincerity associated with
the religious practice and belief in question. 70 The Supreme Court
has denied purely secular beliefs the protection of the Free Exercise
Clause.271
Sincerity and validity are, of course, separate matters. 272 In
Thomas v. Review Board,273 the Court announced, "[R]eligious beliefs
need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to
others in order to merit First Amendment protection. ' 274 Further-
more, the Court has held that newly adopted religious beliefs are fully
protected.275
Sincerity inquiries are, to be sure, not without their dangers:
Even though the courts apply an expansive approach to defining"religion" in free exercise cases,... claimants cannot have un-
limited recourse to free exercise exemptions; if they did, the
concept of required accommodation could become a limitless
excuse for people to avoid all unwanted legal obligations. At
the same time, however, an intrusive government inquiry into
the nature of the claimant's beliefs would in itself threaten the
values of religious liberty.2 76
268. The text in italics reflects the proposed amendment to RFRA's current language.
Although the language of RFRA closely resembles traditional "strict" or "heightened"
scrutiny as applied in other areas of constitutional interpretation, these amendments will
have no effect on the other areas. Any discussion of parallel amendments to the compel-
ling interest test as applied in other contexts is beyond the scope of this Note.
269. The specific language incorporating this additional requirement may be worded as
follows: "Religious claimants challenging Government actions must demonstrate that their
practice is part of a sincerely held religious belief."
270. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1242 (2d ed. 1988).
271. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972) ("if the Amish asserted their
claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular
values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and
isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious basis.").
272. TRIBE, supra note 270, at 1243 (citing Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707,711 n.3,
715-16 (1981)).
273. 450 U.S. 707 (1978).
274. Id at 714.
275. TRIBE, supra note 270, at 1243 (citing Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n,
480 U.S. 136 (1987)).
276. Id at 1243-44 (citations omitted).
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Simply stated, the Court has held that, although a court can eval-
uate whether the claimant's beliefs are sincerely held, it may not de-
termine whether they are valid.277 For example, in Wisconsin v.
Yoder, the Court scrutinized the tenets of Amish culture to determine
whether the reluctance of the Amish to educate their children beyond
the eighth grade was truly a part of their religious beliefs.278 Similarly,
in Sherbert v. Verner, the Court recognized that the claimant's refusal
to work on the Saturday sabbath stemmed from a cardinal principle of
her religious faith. 79 In United States v. Ballard,80 Justice Douglas
wrote:
Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put
to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs .... The reli-
gious views espoused by respondents might seem incredible, if
not preposterous, to most people. But if these doctrines are
subject to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or
falsity, then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of
any sect. When the triers of fact undertake that task, they enter
a forbidden domain.
2 8 '
The proposed amendments would do nothing to strengthen the
compelling interest test either on a theoretical level or as Congress
intended. They would, however, result in a more consistent applica-
tion of this powerful test, thereby enhancing the test as a practical
matter. Consequently, the amendments are simply designed to assure
that the unpredictable pattern of pre-Smith case law is not repeated.
C. Why Amend RFRA?
What would these amendments accomplish? First, RFRA would
more faithfully implement Congress' desire to provide expansive pro-
tection for free exercise rights. Furthermore, the amendments would
make it easier for courts to balance the interests of the government
and the claimants, because courts would have a specific mandate from
Congress that the government must provide a compelling interest not
only for enacting the policy itself, but also for not granting an exemp-
tion from the policy.-8 Critics have argued that RFRA's flaws include
the reinstatement of a test that creates arbitrary results3.23 This argu-
277. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944).
278. 406 U.S. at 222-29, 235-36.
279. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
280. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
281. It at 86-87.
282. This is essentially the argument advocated by the Cheemas. Stephen Bomse, at-
torney for the plaintiffs states, "'The issue is not whether the school board had a compel-
ling interest in preventing violence in schools .... but whether they have a compelling
interest in denying an exemption to a handful of Sikh students."' Nordhaus, supra note
260, at 1.
283. Saison, supra note 99, at 672-74.
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ment is not meritless. However, the wavering nature of the decisions
preceeding Smith resulted not from the misgivings about the compel-
ling interest test itself, but in its inconsistent application. These
amendments would better ensure that this mistake is not repeated and
that the test is properly and consistently applied.
Furthermore, the amendments improve legislative deliberation
regarding exemptions. Although the legislature may create exemp-
tions to its own policies at any time after its enactment,28 Cheema v.
Thompson illustrates that lawmakers should consider creating exemp-
tions at the time of the law's creation. And if the government is aware
that it must present a compelling interest where it denies an exemp-
tion to governmental policies, the legislative policy itself will be better
thought out. This will occur because the creators of the policies will
expect parties to seek exemptions and will formulate the language of
their policies accordingly. Moreover, once burdens on religious sects
are brought to the attention of lawmakers, pursuant to Congress'
mandate in RFRA, these exemptions will more readily be granted by
the legislature. And finally, even if such an exemption is not legisla-
tively created, explicit authority through specific provisions in RFRA
for the courts to do so would encourage courts to be more rights
protective.
But making exemptions readily available is not the only purpose
these new amendments would serve. Adding an explicit requirement
of religious sincerity to RFRA would reinforce the existing jurispru-
dence in the area and would require claimants to show more than that
a law may infringe on their freedoms. In fact, the claimant must
prove, as an element of a prima facie case, that the beliefs and prac-
tices are sincere and religiously motivated. Explicit language in
RFRA as to this burden would discourage claimants attempting to use
religious convictions to accomplish secular goals. Essentially, it would
reduce abuse of the free exercise principles in challenges of facially
neutral laws. In addition, this safeguard of proof required by the
claimant would appease public reluctance to grant judicially carved
exemptions to facially neutral statutes.285 For example, claimants of a
cult who advocate that their religion dictates carrying guns to school
would initially have to prove that the carrying of a gun is a religiously
motivated act and part of a sincerely held religious belief.
In the end, the burden of proof would operate as follows: claim-
ants must prove that their beliefs or practices are sincerely held reli-
gious beliefs or practices, and show that the law as enacted
284. Such an attempt was made by the California legislature in Senate Bill 89. Calif.
S.B. 89, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. § 626.10(g) (1993). See supra note 267.
285. See supra note 257 and accompanying text, for discussion regarding public fears of
abuse of religious rights to accomplish secular goals.
916 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23:877
substantially hinders the free exercise of their religion;286 the burden
would then shift to the state to demonstrate that there is a compelling
interest for the regulation and for denying an exemption for the par-
ticular plaintiffs. This is what would be meant by the requirement that
there are no less restrictive alternatives to accomplish the compelling
goal. If, at that time, the plaintiff or the court sua sponte, finds other
less restrictive means,287 then the burden would again shift back to the
government to prove why these less restrictive means would not suffi-
ciently further the compelling governmental interest.
Although these possible amendments to RFRA may not substan-
tially change the content or the intent of the Act, they will clarify its
burdens, and, consequently, encourage consistent judicial decision-
making. Explicitly allowing judges to create exemptions from laws,
where the government has failed to articulate a compelling interest in
denying the exemption, would result in strengthening the "least re-
strictive means" prong of RFRA's test and would more clearly allo-
cate the burdens of proof required of both parties. Overall, this would
foster judicial expediency. Finally, requiring claimants to prove that
their beliefs or practices are sincerely held would serve as a safeguard
against claims by those who seek to use the shield of the Free Exercise
Clause to advance secular goals. This requirement would thus give
greater legitimacy to RFRA in the view of those who fear that such an
extension of free exercise rights might inundate courts with frivolous
challenges to valid statutes.
D. Applying RFRA's New Amendments
As a practical matter, the suggested changes in RFRA will not
affect a substantial number of cases. After all, if RFRA were applied
as it was supposed to be, the amendments would be unnecessary. On
the other hand, clarification of how the compelling interest test should
be applied will lead to some difference in results. A cursory review of
how the amended RFRA would apply to two recent cases will illus-
trate the ways the amendments may affect free exercise claims.
Estep v. Dent288 is a case where the district court properly applied
the current language of RFRA, thus rendering the proposed amend-
ments superfluous. In Estep, a prisoner moved for a preliminary in-
junction in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and RFRA, alleging that
prison officials had violated his First and Eighth Amendment rights by
286. This factor is already a part of RFRA. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a).
287. In cases such as Cheema v. Thompson, evidence of other similarly situated govern-
mental entities employing these less restrictive means would suffice as evidence that there
are indeed less restrictive means. In Cheema, the Yuba, Live Oak, and Selma school dis-
tricts permitted kirpans to be brought to school with certain restrictions. See supra text
accompanying notes 227-229.
288. 914 F. Supp. 1462, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2054 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 19, 1996).
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(1) failing to provide outdoor exercise for him while he was housed at
a three celhouse; (2) failing to provide out of cell exercise for him
with protective custody inmates only; and finally (3) cutting his
earlocks in violation of his religious beliefs while the matter was pend-
ing.2 89 After addressing the Eighth Amendment claims, the district
court found that the Orthodox Hasidic Jew challenger's claim could
be sustained under RFRA.2 ° In justifying cutting of the claimant's
earlocks, the government articulated three interests: (1) preventing
prisoners from hiding contraband in their hair, (2) promoting hygiene
standards, and (3) allowing for immediate identification of inmates.
The court found that although these interests could be deemed com-
pelling, there was no evidence that this was the least restrictive means
for accomplishing that goal.291 Although the court did not expressly
say so, the court granted the prisoner's motion, not because the State's
interests asserted were not compelling, but because the state could not
articulate a compelling reason for denying him an exemption.2 2 The
court found dispositive the fact that the prison had waited three
months to cut the challenger's hair and held that this fact undercut the
government's argument that the interest was truly compelling.293 In
addition, the court noted that the small amount of hair involved was
not sufficient to pose a risk that the challenger would carry contra-
band.294 Finally, the court found that the prison could take photo-
graphs of the petitioner to alleviate the safety risk.295 The correct,
albeit confusing application, of RFRA by the district court in Estep
illustrates how in certain cases, the proposed amendments may be
unnecessary.
United States v. Bauer,29 6 however, presents a situation that dem-
onstrates the worth of the proposed amendments. In Bauer, a group
of Rastafarians raised a free exercise defense to numerous criminal
charges, including conspiracy, money laundering, illegal use of
telecommunciation services, and others relating to the use and distri-
bution of marijuana.297 The defendants claimed that their use of mari-
juana was emphasized in their religion and should be exempt from the
State's criminal laws as applied to them.298 The government moved to
preclude the appellants from presenting evidence of their possession
289. Id. at *4.
290. Id. at *8-*17.





296. 75 F.3d 1366 (1996).
297. Id. at 1370.
298. Id. at 1373.
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or use of marijuana for religious purposes as a legal defense.299 The
district court granted the motion, relying on the reasoning of Smith.30 0
During the course of the proceeding, the claimants realized that
RFRA was about to be enacted by Congress and brought this fact to
the attention of the court.30 1 Consequently, they filed motions seek-
ing the court to instruct the jury to use the balancing test of Sherbert
and Yoder.30 2 The district court denied their motions.30 3 It held that
the government had an overriding interest in regulating marijuana
which justified general applicability of the law.304 In dicta, however,
the court held that even if RFRA were applied, the result on the mo-
tion in limine would not have changed.
305
Upon appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court.3°6 It
based its reversal on the application of RFRA to the facts of the case
and criticized the lower court's actions. The Ninth Circuit noted, "The
district court treated the existence of marijuana laws as dispositive of
the question whether the government had chosen the least restrictive
means of preventing the sale and distribution of marijuana."307
Although the Ninth Circuit recognized that RFRA did not preclude
the possibility that the least restrictive means for furthering the gov-
ernment's compelling interest might be a universal enforcement of the
marijuana laws, it held that the district court was remiss in not having
gone through the analysis. 0 8
If RFRA contained the explicit language provided by the pro-
posed amendments, it is unlikely that the district court would have
reasoned the way it did. In addition to justifying the marijuana laws,
the government would have been required to identify a compelling
interest for failing to grant the defendants an exemption. In so doing,
the court would have realized that the state's actions were not the
least restrictive way to accomplish this result. Even if the court con-
cluded differently, at the very least, the government would have had
to provide a stronger reason for justifying its actions. Although
neither Estep nor Bauer predict exactly the possible effects on RFRA
after the proposed amendments are taken into account, they do
demonstrate that the beneficial effects to some free exercise cases








306. Id at 1375-76.
307. Id at 1375.
308. Id
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Conclusion
Justice O'Connor once observed that "it is inevitable that the sec-
ular interests of government and the religious interests of various sects
and their adherents will frequently intersect, conflict, and com-
bine. ' 30 9 When these interests conflict, it is for the courts to find a
compromise.
As with most constitutional cases, Cheema v. Thompson requires
the balancing of two sets of interests: those of the state and those of
the individuals. Yet, the inherent difficulty of the case lies in the fact
that the interests being balanced are important and conflicting, to
which there really is no perfect compromise. While the startling statis-
tics of violence in America's schools continue to grow, remedies for
this social ill cannot and should not undermine a fundamental premise
of our Constitution-the right to the free exercise of religion. In the
end, it will be for courts to determine which compromise is the one
most legally justifiable. And Congress, through RFRA, took upon the
responsibility to assist courts in this determination.
Unfortunately, Congress was not entirely clear in directing the
courts. Absent clarity, judicial decisions under RFRA have wandered
astray, in some cases, failing to protect free exercise claimants as in-
tended by Congress. Thus, RFRA should be amended to provide the
necessary guidance. By adding a requirement of "sincerity of religious
beliefs," and modifying the compelling interest requirement to indi-
cate that the state must also have a compelling interest in denying an
exemption from a law for free exercise claimants, RFRA will better
serve its statutory purposes.
Perhaps these amendments will not solve every new issue or
question involving the free exercise of religion. Perhaps a single stat-
ute can never completely dictate solutions to social problems.
Amending RFRA will, however, assist the court in finding a compro-
mise between the Livingston Union School District and the Cheemas.
And more importantly, it will guide future courts to find more com-
promises to cases arising under free exercise principles.
309. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).

